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Freedom of Speech in Public Schools:
Using Communication Analysis to




Since 1969, when the Supreme Court decided Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent School District,1 federal and state courts have been called
upon to adjudicate a variety of student free speech claims, including
those arising from student protests,2 school newspaper censorship,3 li-
brary book4 and textbook5 selection and removal, selection and cancella-
tion of school plays,6 student dress codes,7 and even senior prom
attendance by same-sex couples.' Part I of this article will discuss the
modes of analysis that courts have used in adjudicating these claims and
will argue that those analyses are poorly suited to the special problems
inherent in student speech controversies. Because the Court has failed to
* J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley, 1988; AB, Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley, 1984. The author also has a Single Subject teaching creden-
tial from San Francisco State University, 1988.
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. See, eg., Boyd v. Board of Directors of McGehee Sch. Dist. No. 17, 612 F. Supp. 86
(E.D. Ark. 1985); Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
3. See, eg., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Nicholson v.
Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Gambino v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 429 F.
Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Pliscou v. Holtville Unified
Sch. Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Cal. 1976).
4. See, ag., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion); Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High Sch. Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Sheck v. Baileyville
Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679 (D. Me. 1982); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp.
1269 (D.N.H. 1979).
5. See, eg., Pratt v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Zykan
v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980); Minarcini v. Strongsville
City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
6. See, eg., Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981); Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ.,
630 F. Supp. 939 (D. Vt. 1986).
7. See, eg., Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d
1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971).
8. Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
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expressly define the school interest that is served by censorship of student
speech, the outcome of student speech disputes has often rested on the
educational ideology of the judges charged with adjudicating those dis-
putes. Part II will present an analytical framework- for the adjudication
of free speech claims brought by high school students.9 That framework
will attempt to define the school's interest in a manner that both meets
the demands of First Amendment adjudication and eliminates the role
educational ideology plays in that adjudication. This Article concludes
by applying the proposed framework to a variety of hypothetical school
speech scenarios, including the conundrum of whether a school can be
constrained from removing books from the school library while retaining
discretion to select and reject textbooks for use in classrooms.
I. Modes Of Analysis
Any analysis of high school students' free speech claims must begin
with the basic premise underlying First Amendment jurisprudence: all
individuals are free to speak on any subject, and to express any view-
point, unless the content of the expression or the manner of its delivery
causes some harm to third parties.10 For a First Amendment analytical
framework to be of practical use, it must provide a definition of "harm"
that embodies a balance between the competing interests concerned. It
must also provide guidelines by which judges can determine when in fact
that harm has occurred or is about to occur. In other words, a frame-
work that is to be applied to student speech must define which school
interests should prevail over student speech rights, and must provide
guidelines for the largely factual determination of what degree of inter-
ference with those school interests constitutes "harm."
Courts have employed different analyses in adjudicating student
speech disputes. Sometimes courts have employed different analyses even
within a single case. Three of these frameworks take the form of tests:
the "substantial disruption" test,11 the "public forum" test, 2 and a cur-
riculum-based analysis. 3 The curriculum-based analysis is not a frame-
work at all, but is instead each judge's educational ideology, his or her
9. This framework will not be a proposed "test" for evaluating those claims, but rather
will attempt to identify which factors are important and which are unimportant to courts
making such evaluations. The framework will include an assessment of the state interests that
courts previously have asserted as justification for the curtailment of student free speech rights.
10. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 464 (1979); Terminiello
v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
11. See Part I.B.
12. See Part I.C.
13. See Part I.D.
subjective opinion of the proper role of education. A judge's educational
ideology works in tandem with whichever of the two other frameworks
that judge uses, giving an individualized interpretation to the frame-
work's general definition of "harm." Objective decision-making de-
mands that the role of educational ideology in student speech dispute
resolution be minimized as much as possible. Unfortunately, because
none of the three frameworks is well suited to the adjudication of student
speech claims, purely objective decision-making has not occurred, and
claims are often decided, by default, according to the judge's own educa-
tional ideology. 4
A. The Role of Educational Ideology
All First Amendment adjudication involves balancing the individ-
ual's free speech interests against the government's interest in sup-
pressing that speech. In regard to public schools and libraries, the result
of that balancing is that "[g]overnment enjoy[s] [the right] to preserve
such tranquility as the facilities' central purpose requires . . . but no
power to exclude peaceful speech or assembly compatible with that
purpose."
1 5
The key issue, therefore, is the definition of the "purpose" of public
schools. Unfortunately, First Amendment analysis of student speech dis-
putes often degenerates into a struggle between competing educational
ideologies. The spoils of the struggle is the right to define the school's
purpose, and hence to determine the outcome of each case.
Scholars have identified three dominant, conflicting educational ide-
ologies:16 (1) "cultural transmission," which "defines education as the
transmission of knowledge, skills, morals, and social rules to the stu-
dent";17 (2) "romanticism," which "views education as the unfolding of
an innate pattern of development facilitated by the proper enviropn-
ment";18 and (3) "progressivism," which defines "the driving force of
education [as] the child's active thinking, stimulated by cognitive con-
14. For two excellent discussions of the history of educational ideology in First Amend-
ment cases concerning schools, see William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The
Supreme Court's Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939 (1987), and Robert B. Keiter,
Judicial Review of Student First Amendment Claims: Assessing the Legitimacy-Competency
Debate, 50 Mo. L. REv. 25, 47-55 (1985).
15. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-21, at 690 (1978).
16. See Lawrence Kohlberg and Rochelle Mayer, Development as the Aim of Education,
42 HARV. EDUC. REV. 449 (1972).
17. Senhauser, supra note 14, at 943; see also Kohlberg and Mayer, supra note 16, at 452-
53.
18. Senhauser, supra note 14, at 945; see also Kohlberg and Mayer, supra note 16, at 451-
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flict; therefore, the educational environment should maximize the stu-
dent's active role." 19
The differences between these three ideologies which are relevant to
First Amendment analysis of student free speech claims are those relat-
ing to each ideology's perception of the proper and necessary relationship
between school and student. Romanticism and progressivism can be
grouped together here, for each holds that the school's basic role is to
elicit some desired skill or attribute from the student; this ideology will
be referred to as "non-inculcative." The cultural transmission model, on
the other hand, seeks to instill information, morals, and the like into the
student; this ideology will be referred to as "inculcative."
In Tinker,20 the Court "did not balance the speech interests involved
against an indoctrinative interest, sacrificing one to protect the other. In-
stead, the Court viewed the protection of student speech as important
because of its educational value."2 The dissent however, had a different
view of education. Justice Black equated allowing students to speak
freely with allowing students to "allocate to themselves the function of
deciding how the pupils' school day will be spent."'22 "The original idea
of schools... ," Justice Black reasoned, "was that students had not yet
reached the point of experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach
all of their elders."23 Given his paternalistic view of the nature of educa-
tion, Justice Black's dissent was not surprising.
This ideological split was even more apparent, and more determina-
tive, in Board of Education v. Pico.24 In that case the Court plurality
held that a school cannot remove books from a school library on the
basis of disagreement with the views expressed therein. The Court cited
with approval the observation of Keyishian v. Board of Regents,25 that
"'students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding,' "26 and reasoned that it is "the
unique role of the school library"2 to provide the student with an oppor-
19. Senhauser, supra note 14, at 947; see also Kohlberg and Mayer, supra note 16, at 454.
20. 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
21. Senhauser, supra note 14, at 955; see Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 ("[Student intercommu-
nication] is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an impor-
tant part of the educational process.").
22. 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 522.
24. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
25. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
26. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957))).
27. Id. at 869.
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tunity to pursue such "self-education and individual enrichment."2
The dissenters, however, did not value the tenets of student inquiry
and evaluation. In Chief Justice Burger's view, "all activity within a pri-
mary or secondary school involves the conveyance of information."29
Similarly, Justice Rehnquist's view of education is that "[e]ducation con-
sists of the selective presentation and explanation of ideas."3 To such
adherents of inculcative educational ideology, there is simply no room in
the schools for independent student research and exploration. Anything
less than absolute school discretion over the content of the library inter-
feres with the school's ability to fulfill its inculcative function.31
As is illustrated by these two cases, and indeed by the entire history
of student speech jurisprudence,32 the use of an analytical framework in
which educational ideology is an important part, leaves student free
speech rights adrift and at the mercy of the shifting ideological winds
generated by each change in court personnel.33 Furthermore, educa-
tional ideology is the province of educators, not judges. The ideal analyt-
28. Id.
29. IdL at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
30. Id at 914 (Rehnquist, 3., dissenting).
31. Student free speech analysis that hinges on the analyst's educational ideology is not
confined to the courts. Professor Tyll van Geel has argued that inculcative ideologies are
incompatible with the First Amendment. Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits
on GovernmentalAuthority to Inculcate Youth, 62 Tx. L. REv. 197, 289 (1983). This is not to
suggest that van Geel's analysis is unprincipled. On the contrary, he objectively argues that
the goals the Supreme Court has found to justify scholastic indoctrination are inadequate. Id
at 262-89. His First Amendment analysis stands or falls on his rejection of inculcative ideol-
ogy, objective though it may be. If the reader rejects van Geel's opposition to indoctrination,
then van Geel's analysis is no longer useful.
Other scholars have fallen prey to the seduction of applying subjective ideologies to stu-
dent speech analysis, and have based their ultimate conclusions regarding the demands of the
First Amendment on concepts such as that "the development as well as the expression of those
beliefs... that constitute individual consciousness should be free of government manipula-
tion." Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First
Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309, 313 (1980). Still another
has criticized the Tinker "substantial disruption" test on the basis that the test "misunder-
stands the pedagogical nature and function of public schools." David A. Diamond, The First
Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REV. 477,
477-78 (1981). See also Leon Letwin, Regulation of Underground Newspapers on Public School
Campuses in California, 22 UCLA L. REv. 141, 199 (1974) (The purported state interest in
regulating student speech to prevent psychological harm to students is illegitimate because
"the opportunity to cope with such ideas is a part of growth and education.").
32. See Senhauser, supra note 14, for a discussion of the role of educational ideology in
free speech jurisprudence.
33. In addition, because most student speech cases are decided in the state and lower
federal courts, an analytical framework that allows decisions to rest so heavily upon the ideolo-
gies of individual judges can only result in the circumstance that students in some parts of the
country enjoy less freedom of speech than their peers who live in jurisdictions where the pre-
siding judges subscribe to a less inculcation-oriented educational ideology.
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ical framework would define both the state interest and the student
interest, so that the principal issue in each case would be whether the
student activity at issue in fact threatens the state interest.
B. The "Substantial Disruption" Test
Since 1969, the principal test that courts have used to assess student
free speech claims has been the "substantial disruption" test announced
that year in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District.34 Tinker
was a suit brought by several students who had been suspended for wear-
ing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. The Court upheld
the students' right to wear the armbands and held that a school regula-
tion that limits students' rights of expression is valid only if it can be
"justified by a showing that the students' activities would materially and
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school."35 Tinker
arose out of a student protest that took place in part in the classroom,
which is a particularized and comparatively rare type of student speech
controversy.36 The fact that this seminal case arose in such unusual cir-
cumstances has had unfortunate ramifications for subsequent student
speech jurisprudence. The substantial disruption test, as it was formu-
lated in Tinker, is reasonably well suited to the adjudication of protest
cases. It is not sufficiently precise, however, for application to other
types of student speech disputes. Its use has led to strained analysis and
has circumscribed paths that courts might have taken toward more satis-
factory accommodations of the competing interests involved in those
cases.
Application of the substantial disruption test to other types of con-
troversies is problematic because "[e]ssential to a definition of disruption
is identification of the disrupted endeavor."37 Thus, conflict adjudication
by use of the substantial disruption test ultimately devolves to a determi-
nation of the question, Disruption of what? In student protest cases, this
question is fairly easily answered: "expression that prevents class meet-
ings or diverts discussions from the subject for a considerable time will
constitute disruption."38 Such criteria are usually not helpful in student
speech cases that do not concern protest. In most student speech cases,
34. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
35. IdL at 513.
36. Most student speech cases concern censorship of student publications, library and
textbook controversies, and the ubiquitous dress code disputes. See supra notes 2-8 and ac-
companying text.




the harm that the school seeks to prevent is not so immediate and tangi-
ble as the direct interruption of class meetings.3 9
Because the substantial disruption test fails to identify the types of
harms that the school may avoid by curtailing student free speech rights,
the question Disruption of what?, is left to be answered according to the
educational ideology of each judge. Therefore, the substantial disruption
test falls short of the ideal set forth above. While the very term "substan-
tial disruption" admirably provides guidelines for determination of when
the school's interest is threatened sufficiently to allow curtailment of stu-
dent free speech rights, the test fails because it does not identify the state
interests whose protection merits such curtailment.
C. The Public Forum Test
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,4 the Supreme Court for
the first time applied public forum analysis to a student free speech case'1
and declined to apply the Tinker substantial disruption test to a school
speech controversy.42 Unfortunately, the Court's decision to abandon
39. In Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 519 (2nd Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit applied
the "substantial disruption" test and upheld the school's prohibition of the distribution to
students of a sex questionnaire that school officials claimed would cause "significant psycho-
logical harm." Idk at 519. The legitimacy of the school's concerns was bolstered by expert
psychological testimony. Id at 517-19.
In Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the "substantial disruption"
test was held fulfilled. There, a school seized an issue of the school newspaper which printed a
letter from the school lacrosse team that complained of the lack of sports coverage by the
newspaper, and which included a threat to "kick your [the editor's] greasy ass." Id at 1046.
The school's action was motivated by "the possibility that: 'an impressionable 14 year old
member of the freshman Lacrosse team [might] take the letter as a license to hunt up the
sports editor for the stated purpose of the letter,"' id at 1051 (quoting affidavit of the princi-
pal); and that" 'the letter foreseeably could provoke a confrontation. .. ' iad (quoting affida-
vit of the newspaper's faculty advisor).
As these cases illustrate, the definition of "substantial disruption" has in practice become
very broad indeed.
40. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
41. The Court has never expressly stated that the public school or any part of it is a public
forum. See Forrest E. Claypool, Note, Public Forum Theory in the Educational Setting: The
First Amendment and the Student Press, 1979 U. ILL. L. REv. 879 (1979). For a discussion of
the contention that Tinker established the public school as a public forum, see Garrison, supra
note 37. See also TRIBE, supra note 15, at 690 (Courts have treated schools as "semi-public
forums."); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public
Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 278 (1970) (The high school campus is a public forum for
purposes of protest and the distribution of literature.). For an opposing view, arguing that
treating the public school as a public forum makes it impossible for schools to fulfill their
educational mandate, see Carol M. Schwetschenau, Note, Constitutional Protection for Student
Speech in Public High Schools: "Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser," 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986),
55 U. Cni. L. REv. 1349 (1987).
42. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270.
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the substantial disruption test in favor of public forum analysis was il-
advised.43 The substantial disruption test, regardless of its flaws, was
designed expressly to balance and accommodate the competing interests
that arise in school free speech cases.44 In contrast, public forum analy-
sis is not school-specific; rather, public forum analysis arose as a means
of dealing with generic, non-school controversies. 4 As a result, public
forum analysis is poorly suited to the resolution of free speech controver-
sies that arise in public schools.
46
Public forum analysis is incompatible with student free speech
claims primarily because the relationship between students and a public
school is not analogous to that between citizens and the state; and the
relationship forms the predicate to the application of the public forum
test. Student speech is routinely restricted and regulated in ways in
which the government cannot regulate the speech of the general citi-
zenry.4 7 Under public forum analysis, speech restrictions would indicate
43. The adoption of public forum analysis necessarily entails a rejection of Tinker.
Although the Tinker majority found it "relevant that the school authorities did not purport to
prohibit the wearing of all symbols of political or controversial significance," 393 U.S. 503, 510
(1969), which might seem to indicate that Tinker stands only in the way of student speech
restrictions that are not content-neutral, the Court found the viewpoint discrimination of the
respondent school district merely "relevant," not controlling. The holding of Tinker is une-
quivocal: "[The student] may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the con-
flict in Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school' and without colliding
with the rights of others." Id. at 512-13 (quoting Burnside v. Byers, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966)). The dependent clause, "even on controversial subjects," demonstrates that con-
tent-neutral restrictions are within the purview of the "substantial disruption" test. Of course,
the question of whether a particular expression is in fact "substantially disruptive" will often
turn on the controversial nature of the expression, but the scope of the applicability of the
Tinker test is, of course, independent of the factual issue of what constitutes "substantial dis-
ruption." Thus, public forum analysis seems to be fundamentally at odds with Tinker.
44. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
45. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (sit-in at public library); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (protest at statehouse grounds).
46. Professors Daniel Farber and John Nowak argue that public forum analysis is irrele-
vant to many free speech claims. As an example, they cite United States Postal Serv. v. Coun-
cil of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), which involved a challenge to a federal
law forbidding the placement of unstamped mailable matter in home mailboxes. Much of the
Court's analysis focused on whether a mailbox is a public forum. "The issue in Greenburgh,
however, was whether the limitation of public access to this medium of communication so
inhibited the communication of ideas as to be inconsistent with the [First [A]mendment. Pub-
lic forum analysis only clouded consideration of the compatibility of the governmental regula-
tion with [F]irst [A]mendment values?' Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading
Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70
VA. L. REV. 1219, 1223 (1984).
47. For example, students are often required to write papers on controversial subjects and
are asked to argue in favor of a viewpoint that they do not share. Also, the subject matter of
speech in the classroom is closely regulated; not only may a student be forbidden to discuss
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that the government has not opened the school to general discourse;
hence, the school is a nonpublic forum. A determination that the school
is a nonpublic forum, however, is by definition a determination that the
school can exclude speech on. any subject, as long as the exclusion is
"reasonable." 48
Use of public forum analysis necessarily will result in the diminution
of student free speech rights, for under the "reasonableness" standard in
Hazelwood, almost any speech restriction will be upheld absent a finding
that the school program which censored the speech is a public forum. In
most cases such a finding will be absent.
In dictum not limited to student newspapers alone, the Hazelwood
majority stated that
The public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets,
parks, and other traditional public forums that "time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions."'49 Hence,
school facilities may be classified as public forums only if school
officials have "by policy or by practice" opened those facilities "for
indiscriminate use by the general public"' 0 or by some segment of
the public, such as student organizations. 5'
The Court, in declaring that public schools are not public forums under
the "traditional use" test, apparently inferred that school newspapers, as
a subset of the public schools, fail the "traditional use" test as well. That
argument has three serious flaws.
First and most serious is that the Court's conclusory statement that
the public school has not traditionally been dedicated to citizen discourse
is premised on an inculcative view of the function of the public school.
In the eyes of an observer who is an adherent of a non-inculcative theory,
which holds that the school's purpose is to foster the development of the
student's innate skills and to elicit critical thinking on the part of the
student, the school can indeed be seen as a traditional public forum. The
non-inculcative schools pursue their educational goals through interac-
tion between student and teacher, and such interaction probably would
fall within the definition of "discourse."52 Public forum analysis, then, is
history in algebra class, but she may be forbidden even to discuss last week's homework in this
week's session.
48. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhhneier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).
49. Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)
(citation omitted)).
50. Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983)).
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. My placement of the word "discourse" in quotation marks here is a recognition that
some might consider the typical content of student verbal intercourse unworthy of a term
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flawed by its dependence on educational ideology. The Hazelwood
Court's conclusory holding that public schools are not "traditional pub-
lic forums" is a stark manifestation of the dangers inherent in using an
analytical framework that is vulnerable to usurpation by educational
ideology.
The second flaw in the Court's reasoning is that outside the class-
room, the public school arguably is akin to streets and parks.5 3 Admit-
tedly, the general public cannot enter the school grounds and conduct
debate as they can at a public park. It seems reasonable, however, that
when a court applies public forum analysis to a school dispute, it should
focus not on whether the general public has access to the school, but
whether the student body has traditionally used the school grounds for
"discourse." In the context of the First Amendment, the hallway, the
playing field, and the lunchroom of the public school seem to stand in the
same relationship to the student as streets and parks to the general pub-
lic. 54 Thus, the Hazelwood Court's holding that the public school is not a
public forum is dubious.
The final flaw in the Court's reasoning is a corollary to the previous
argument. The Court concluded that the public school is not a tradi-
tional public forum and seemed satisfied that, such being the case, the
school newspaper is also not a traditional public forum." As alluded to
above, the public school is composed of many disparate arenas and activ-
ities, any one of which might have traditionally been used for public dis-
course by the student body. A bare finding that the public schools are
not traditional public forums does not determine whether a particular
facet of the school is in fact a public forum, despite the Hazelwood major-
ity's erroneous assumption that such a finding as to the whole school was
in fact a finding that the school newspaper was not a public forum.
traditionally associated with the lofty goals of the First Amendment i.e., preserving the demo-
cratic system by granting citizens the right and the opportunity to debate pressing matters of
public urgency. The First Amendment, however, does not countenance such distinctions
among subjects of discourse.
53. See Nahmod, supra note 41, at 294.
54. It does not detract from this argument to point out that, even in the hallways, student
free speech rights might be subject to greater restrictions than are the rights of citizens in the
park. Those more stringent restrictions, if they are legitimate, are legitimate not because stu-
dents have fewer rights than adult citizens, nor because the school hallways are not public
forums, but because those restrictions serve school interests that are absent in the streets and
parks. See infra Part II.A.
55. The Court never expressly stated that all school newspapers are not public forums.
Rather, the Court simply made a conclusory statement that the public schools are not tradi-
tional public forums, 484 U.S. at 266, and then determined whether the school newspaper at
issue was opened by the school authorities for "indiscriminate use" by the student body. Id at
270 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 19:123
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Thus, Hazelwood's finding as to the public school as a whole is not dis-
positive of future cases.
This flaw is serious because public forum analysis simply is not
equipped to generate any rule that is broadly and easily applicable to
"the public school" as a whole. The Tinker substantial disruption test,
which was designed to deal with school speech controversies, is equally
applicable to disputes arising in all school contexts. In contrast, the de-
termination that a school newspaper is not a public forum offers little
guidance to a court considering the First Amendment status of school
plays;56 likewise, a decision regarding school plays sheds little light on
controversies regarding the school library, textbooks, or the senior prom.
Indeed, public forum analysis is particularly ill-suited to the adjudi-
cation of the most troublesome of school speech issues: library book and
textbook censorship. These types of controversies involve not the right
to speak, but the right to receive information. The right57 to receive in-
formation and the issues raised in adjudicating it are not consonant with
the themes of public forum analysis.5"
Application of the second public forum test, whether "the govern-
ment 'by policy or by practice' has opened the [public school or parts
thereof] for 'indiscriminate use by the general public' or by some segment
56. Although Hazelwood contains much dicta that indicates school plays should be
treated analogously to school newspapers, that part of the Court's opinion dealt not with
whether the newspaper was a public forum, but rather it set forth the Court's rationale for
applying a different test to censorship of "school-sponsored" speech than to censorship of
student speech that just "happens to occur" on campus. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-73.
This aspect of Hazelwood is discussed infra at Part II.D.
57. Whether such a right in fact exists is a matter of much controversy. The right to
receive information was first expressly recognized by the Court in Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982), although, as Justice Brennan's plurality opinion argues, id. at 866, the
right has antecedents in dicta in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) and First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
The Pico dissenters vigorously criticized the plurality for resting their opinion on the
existence of a right that "has [not] previously been recognized." 457 U.S. at 887 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Rehnquist considered "the very existence of a right to receive information
... [to be] wholly unsupported by our past decisions and inconsistent with the necessarily
selective process of elementary and secondary education." Id. at 910. See also Mark Tushnet,
Free Expression and the Young Adul" A Constitutional Framework, 1976 U. ILL. L. REV. 746,
753 (1976) ("Whatever the rationale for excluding young adults from voting probably would
justify denying them the First Amendment right to receive information.").
For the purposes of this Article it can be assumed that the right to receive information
does indeed exist; and hereinafter all references to "student free speech rights" or "student
First Amendment rights" should be understood to include the right to receive information.
58. By the same token, the substantial disruption test is equally ill-equipped to adjudicate
such claims. See infra notes 139-58. The framework proposed in Part II of this article does,
however, accommodate this issue.
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of the public,"59 is extremely awkward. First, that test cannot yield uni-
form rules for application to schools in general because each school, and
indeed each classroom, has different policies in regard to student expres-
sion. Thus, the public forum test will yield different results from school
to school and from classroom to classroom.
Of course, this problem is not unique to public forum analysis of
student free speech claims, for results can vary when the test is applied to
hospitals,' courthouses, 61 and other state-owned properties. Unlike hos-
pitals and jails, however, the very purpose of schools necessitates some
form of communication between school and student. Each school's or
teacher's view of that purpose, the educational ideology of each school
and teacher, is likely to yield widely divergent policies in regard to stu-
dent discourse. Thus, while divergent hospital or jail policies may lead to
uneven results, divergent policies by different schools must lead to un-
even results.62
Use of the public forum test can also yield unrealistic, undesirable
results and can involve the decision-maker in unnecessary complexities.
Because the test focuses on past school procedures, a change in proce-
dures can implicate free speech rights and lead to additional burdensome
litigation. For example, the State of California currently has a law that
guarantees to student publishers the right to publish articles on any
topic, subject only to a few relatively unrestrictive statutory limitations.63
Were that law repealed, the procedural history engendered by the statute
59. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46, 47 n.7 (1983).
60. Compare Low Income People Together v. Manning, 615 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ohio
1985) with Dallas County Hosp. Dist. v. Dallas Ass'n of Community Orgs. for Reform Now,
670 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1052 (1982).
61. Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963).
62. The public forum analysis of Hazelwood illustrates the extent to which the results of
public forum analysis can be very dependent upon the facts of the particular case.
The majority emphasized that the faculty advisor" 'was the final authority with respect to
almost every aspect of the production and publication of [the school newspaper], including its
content,"' 484 U.S. at 268 (citation omitted), and endorsed the trial court's finding that
"[r]espondents' assertion that they had believed that they could publish 'practically anything'
in [the school newspaper] Spectrum was. . . 'not credible.' Id. at 269 (citation omitted).
The Court's analysis implies that, had the administration exercised less control over the
school newspaper, or if the students had had legitimate reason to believe that they could in fact
print "practically anything," the outcome of the Court's public forum analysis might have
been different. (The outcome of the case would probably have been the same, for as argued
supra at notes 40-46, and infra notes 139-42, the Court's determination that the content of
school newspapers can be closely regulated by the school administration did not rest on a
finding that all school newspapers are non-public forums.).
63. Cal. Educ. Code § 48907 (West Supp. 1987).
would remain, because for the period that the statute had been in force,
California schools had in fact treated school newspapers as public fo-
rums. Could a California school subsequently institute Hazelwood-style
restrictions, or would the past procedures, mandated by the now-defunct
statute, preserve the school newspaper as a public forum?" Such are the
issues engendered by public forum analysis.
Public forum analysis suffers from an additional disability when ap-
plied to school free speech controversies. When the analysis is applied to
the typical non-school case, the issue is simply whether the facility has
been opened for discourse by the "general public. ' 65 Thus, there is typi-
cally no need to differentiate among speakers, and public forum analysis
works reasonably well.
In contrast, school speech controversies can involve the rights of
students, teachers,66 and outside speakers.67 Results of the application of
the public forum test will vary according to which of these groups is
involved and each school's past policies toward speech by each group.
Because the rights of each group must be determined by looking to the
policies that the school has followed in regard to that group alone, the
adjudication of one group's claim will shed little or no light on the rights
of any of the other groups. Use of the public forum test, therefore, can
lead to inefficient, multiplicative litigation.
The merits of public forum analysis for adjudicating most free
speech claims are not at issue here. It is not an indictment of public
forum analysis to recognize that student speech cases should be exempt
from its application. Instead, that recognition is simply a confirmation
that for First Amendment purposes, schools are indeed a "special envi-
ronment. ' 68 Therefore, adjudication of free speech cases that arise in
that environment demands a specialized form of analysis to complement
public forum analysis when public forum analysis is inappropriate.
64. But see Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
("[A] State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility ...
65. Ia at 47; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
66. See, eg., Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979); Palmer v. Board of
Educ., 466 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Millikan v. Board of Directors, 611 P.2d 414 (Wash.
1980).
67. See, eg., Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 F.2d 1046 (5th
Cir. 1985); Clergy and Laity Concerned v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 586 F. Supp. 1408 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Solmitz v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 59, 495 A.2d 812 (Me. 1985). For a discussion
of what limits, if any, exist on schools' power to exclude outside speakers, see Garrison, supra
note 37, at 28.
68. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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D. Curriculum-Based Analysis
Many commentators have argued that in order for schools to oper-
ate properly, school officials must be granted a great deal of discretion in
their administration of the school.69 School officials are not, however,
entitled to deference in regard to issues that do not concern education.
In either explicit or implicit recognition of these arguments, many courts
have addressed student speech claims by applying a curriculum-based
test.70 Under this analysis, courts give school officials authority to pro-
scribe student speech that affects curriculum-for example, speech oc-
curring in the classroom. But these same courts frown upon official
censorship that takes place during noncurricular or extracurricular activ-
ities-for example, in the hallway between classes, or on the football
field-unless the censored speech threatens to disrupt the curriculum.
This approach is not without attractions. It provides a more satis-
factory analysis of speech controversies not involving student protest
than does the Tinker test, because, unlike Tinker, it does not require a
court to answer the question, "disruption of what"?71 Moreover, it is
based on a recognition that the state interest in curtailing student speech
is quite low when noncurricular matters are at issue.
Unfortunately, curriculum-based analysis suffers from serious flaws.
It is of little use in assessing censorship of speech that occurs in noncur-
ricular arenas but that might have an indirect effect on curricular mat-
ters. More importantly, the curriculum/noncurriculum distinction is at
its heart a form of balancing by proxy. The analysis equates the school
interest with curriculum. For all purposes, this analysis declines to un-
dertake true case-by-case balancing of interests and instead operates on
the assumption that when curriculum is affected by speech, the balance
69. See Schwetschanau, supra note 41; Keiter, supra note 14, and cases cited therein.
70. Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in matters of
curriculum by reliance upon their duty to inculcate community values. But we think
that petitioners' reliance upon that duty is misplaced where, as here, they attempt to
extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond the compulsory environment of the
classroom, into the school library and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there
holds sway.
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982). See also Gambino v. Fairfax County Sch.
Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977) (school news-
paper is not part of the school curriculum). See also Karen Kramer Faaborg, High School Play
Censorship: Are Students' Rights Violated When Officials Cancel Theatrical Productions?, 14
J.L. & EDuc. 575 (1985) (criticizing Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1981) for an
overly broad definition of "curriculum."); Deborah A. Churton-Hale, Note, Tinker Goes to the
Theater: Student First Amendment Rights and High School Theatrical Productions in Seyfried
v. Walton, I 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 247, 254 (1984) ("Characterization of the play as part of
the school 'curriculum' is inconsistent with accepted definitions of the term.").
71. See supra Part I.B.
between student rights and the school interest almost always will tilt in
favor of the school, but when curriculum is not affected, the balance gen-
erally sways in favor of protection of student rights.7 2 Not only is this an
abdication of the Court's responsibility to actually weigh competing in-
terests, but the curriculum/noncurriculum distinction has developed an
inertia of its own. Courts and commentators who employ label-based
analyses tend to base their decisions on the label itself, rather than on the
policies that underlie the label and for which policies the label is simply
shorthand.7" The result, at best, is the use of definitions of "curriculum"
that simply reflect the prejudices of the particular judge; and, at worst,
the result is the use of definitions of "curriculum" that simply are irrele-
vant to First Amendment analysis.
This latter result can occur when the judge employs a dictionary
definition of curriculum. The only definition of curriculum consistent
with curriculum-based analysis is, roughly, the parts of the school day in
which unfettered student speech, if allowed, would interfere with the ac-
complishment of the school purpose, whatever it may be. Use of a defini-
tion such as "(1) the courses offered by an educational institution or one
of its branches; [or] (2) a set of courses constituting an area of specializa-
tion,"'74 is simply useless as an aid to a court attempting to balance com-
peting First Amendment interests, because those interests do not figure
in the formulation of the definition.
72. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 283 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting),
[U]nder Tinker, the school may constitutionally punish the budding political orator
if he disrupts class but not if he holds his tongue for the cafeteria. That is not be-
cause some more stringent standard applies in the curricular context.... It is be-
cause student speech in the noncurricular context is less likely to disrupt materially
any legitimate pedagogical purpose.
(citation omitted); accord C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in
First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 109, 110 (1986) ("[C]onceptual ap-
proaches... simply yield an inadequate jurisprudence of labels. In place of careful, candid
weighing of competing free speech and public order values, . . . judicial opinions embodying
conceptualistic, categorical analyses reflect under-the-table definitional balancing."); see also
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 821 (1985) ("Rather than taking the nature of the property into account in balancing the
First Amendment interests of the speaker and society's interest in freedom of speech against
the interest served by reserving the property to its normal use, the Court simply labels the
property and dispenses with the balancing.").
73. For an analysis of the different processes that courts and commentators use to define
First Amendment-related terms, and a discussion of the consequences which flow from the use
of those processes, see Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in
ThreeActs, 34 VAND. L. REv. 265, 269-73 (1981) and the authorities cited therein.
74. Faaborg, supra note 70, at 590; see also Churton-Hale, supra note 70, at 254 (quoting
WEBsR's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 348 (2d college ed. 1968)).
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The better of the two results of curriculum-based analysis leads back
to the old bugaboo of school speech analysis, namely, educational ideol-
ogy. If the outcome of a controversy rests on whether the speech affects
curriculum, then the outcome in fact rests on the definition of curricu-
lum. In turn, that definition rests on the educational ideology of the
judge formulating the definition. An adherent of the inculcative ideol-
ogy, which views the entire school day as a learning experience,7" may
define curriculum so broadly as to annul the distinction between curricu-
lar and noncurricular elements of the school day and thereby severely
curtail student speech rights.
The impracticality of curriculum-based analysis is evident on exami-
nation of the various controversies that most often arise in the school
setting. For example, is a school newspaper a part of the curriculum?
The Hazelwood majority reasoned that "activities may fairly be charac-
terized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a
traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to stu-
dent participants and audiences."76 The dissent argued with equal force,
however, that the curricular aspect of a school newspaper begins and
ends with teaching the skills of research, writing, and editing a newspa-
per, so that the actual content of the published articles is beyond the
scope of the curriculum.77 Both definitions are persuasive, but neither is
helpful to a court that is trying to perform the basic task facing courts in
student speech cases: balancing the student speaker's interests against
those of the school.
Similarly, the Pico plurality rested its decision--curtailing school of-
ficials' discretion to remove books from the school library--on its view
that the school library serves an educational function different from that
of the rest of the school.7" The dissent, however, took a very different
view of the curricular role played by the school library:
The libraries of [elementary and secondary] schools serve as sup-
plements to [the schools'] inculcative role. Unlike university or
public libraries, elementary and secondary school libraries are not
designed for freewheeling inquiry; they are tailored, as the public
school curriculum is tailored, to the teaching of basic skills and
75. See, eg., Diamond, supra note 31, at 478 n.4 ( "The teaching function of school per-
vades the school day. Children are educated... when they are required to walk in an orderly
fashion from class to class, despite their desire to run.").
76. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
77. Id. at 283-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868-69 (1982). See supra notes 24-28 and ac-
companying text. See also infra Part II.C.
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ideas.79
The viability of the Pico decision rests on the continued acceptance of the
noninculcative ideology inherent in the plurality's view of the role of the
school library.
The fatal flaw of curriculum-based analysis is manifest: there can be
no consistency to school free speech jurisprudence if courts employ an
analysis that leaves the crucial issues of the nature and weight of the
school's interest to the whim of each judge's educational ideology.
II. Proposed Analytical Framework
A. Schools Have Greater Power to Limit Speech Than Society Has in
General
All free speech adjudication requires the assessment of both the
speaker's right to be heard (or the listener's right to receive informa-
tion8 ) and the weight of the state's interest in suppressing the speech.
But it is the state interest that judges should focus on when deciding
student speech cases. There are four reasons that the state interest is of
primary importance.
First, as argued in Part I, the analytical frameworks that judges use
to assess student speech claims do not provide a means of assessing the
state interest asserted in each case. The result is that the assessment of
the state interest, and hence the final outcome of each case, ultimately
rests on the educational ideology of each judge."1 To avoid the pitfalls
inherent in allowing educational ideology to play a dominant role in stu-
dent free speech adjudication, 2 courts should use a framework that ana-
lyzes the state interest in a manner independent of educational ideology.
Second, the weight of the student interest involved in each case has
historically been of little consequence in the adjudication of student free
speech claims because there has been very little disagreement among
judges regarding that interest. As a rule, courts and commentators agree
that student free speech interests are indeed quite weighty. The cases
reveal a largely unarticulated but nonetheless widespread recognition
that student free speech claims which are unsuccessful in the school con-
text might prevail in outside society. Dissenting in Pico, Chief Justice
79. Pico, 457 U.S. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. See supra note 57.
81. See Senhauser, supra note 14.
82. See Walter A. Kamiat, Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-State
Voices in the School" Justifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REV.
497, 505 (1983), which argues that the reason for the confusion of Pico's many opinions is that
"very few of the opinions of the prevailing judges analyzed the legitimacy of this asserted state
indoctrinative interest."
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Burger refused to condemn the removal of books from the school library
in part on the grounds that "no restraints of any kind are placed on the
students. They are free to read the books in question, which are available
at public libraries and bookstores ... This reasoning rests on the
assumption that public libraries cannot deny students access to the books
at issue. Because the weight of the student interest in receiving informa-
tion does not fluctuate as the student crosses and recrosses the threshold
of the school entrance, the school library's greater ability to restrict the
free speech rights of students must be traceable to some interest held by
the school library that is not shared by its civic counterpart. The opera-
tive variable that distinguishes the school library from the public library,
then, is not the nature of the student interest but the nature of the state
interest.
84
Third, the very fact that educational ideology has played a dominant
role in student free speech jurisprudence demonstrates that the nature of
the state interest has indeed been the determinative issue in student
speech balancing, because educational ideology has operated in the guise
and in the role of the state interest. Time and again, student speech cases
have depended not on the weight of the student interest, but on the
weight of the state interest as it is defined by each judge's educational
ideology. 5 If the influence of educational ideology is eliminated, the stu-
dent interest and the state interest are not left on even footing. Instead,
the student interest remains of little consequence, while the state interest
reacquires from educational ideology the role of the determinant variable
in the balancing equation.
Finally, analysis of school speech controversies must focus on the
state-interest arm of the balance because the existence of a greater state
interest is the only way that legitimate school speech restrictions can be
distinguished from other speech restrictions which, if applied to school-
aged citizens by society at large, would be illegitimate. Although various
rights of children can be curtailed to a greater extent than can the rights
of adults-examples range from compulsory education laws to age re-
strictions on the right to vote86-- those curtailments do not extend to free
83. Pico, 457 U.S. at 886.
84. The widespread recognition of the weight of the student interest is further evidenced
by the almost talismanic recitation in every school speech case, regardless of outcome, of
Tinker's assertion that "students... [do not] shed their constitutional... rights at the school-
house gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988); Pico, 457 U.S. at 886 kBurger, C.J., dissent-
ing), 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text, and Part I.A.
86. Even these restrictions can be seen as legitimate not because children's rights in these
areas are less than the rights of adults, but rather that the state has compelling interests which
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speech rights. Indeed, the free speech rights of school-age citizens
outside of school are largely coterminous with those of adults.
8 7
The reason that speech restrictions which would be unconstitutional
if applied to school-aged minors by society at large become legitimate
when applied by school officials to their students is traceable not to some
lesser student interest but to a greater state interest in education. The
truth of this thesis becomes more apparent on the realization that not
only are the rights of students subject to greater restrictions in school
than outside of school, but so too are the rights of adults."8 For example,
the free speech rights of adult school students are subject to many of the
same restrictions that apply to minor students.8 9 Surely, the most basic
of student speech restrictions, those pertaining to the subject of class-
room discussions, are the same for both minor students and adult stu-
dents. In addition, courts have repeatedly held that the academic
freedom of elementary and secondary school teachers is subject to
are served by limiting the exercise of these rights by children. Compulsory education laws are
legitimate not because the liberty interests of children are less substantial than the liberty
rights of adults, but because the state has a compelling interest in ensuring that its citizens are
educated. Similarly, voting age restrictions do not reflect a judgment that citizens under 18
years old have less stake in the outcome of elections than do their elders; instead, those laws
are legitimate because they serve the state interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral
system.
87. See, e.g., Aladdin's Castle Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980), in
which the court overturned a local ordinance making it illegal for the operator of a coin-
operated amusement machine to allow it to be used by minors unaccompanied by a parent or
guardian. The court analyzed the ordinance as a limitation on minors' First Amendment right
of association. The court stated that "[t]he standard that the ordinance must meet is not
reduced because minors are involved." Id. at 1042. Accord Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are pro-
tected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.").
See also Tushnet, supra note 57, at 747 ("If a statute prohibits certain expressive activities
by young persons that would be protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment if engaged in by adults,
the statute probably is unconstitutional.") (citation omitted); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("If respondent had given the same
speech outside of the school environment, he could not have been penalized simply because
government officials considered his language to be inappropriate.").
88. It is essential at this point to clarify one matter. I do not argue that the rights of
minors are precisely congruent with those of adults. Adults, simply by virtue of their status as
adults have interests that minors do not have. For example, it can be argued that compulsory
education laws could not constitutionally be applied to adults, even though the state interest in
having an educated citizenry is no less in regard to adults than in regard to minors, because
adults have legal responsibilities that they could not meet if they were burdened by the time
requirements of education. The state interest falls before the interests of adults but defeats the
interests of minors not because the liberty interest of adults is qualitatively different from the
liberty interest of minors, but because the minors' liberty interest stands alone, while the adult
liberty interest is supplemented by the adult interest in meeting legal and financial duties.
89. See Fischler v. Municipal Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 882, 883-84 (1965).
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greater limitations by the state than is the academic freedom of teachers
and professors at the post-secondary level.90 The distinction between ele-
mentary and secondary teachers on the one hand, and post-secondary
teachers on the other, stems not from a disparity between the rights of
each group of instructors, nor from some idea that elementary and secon-
dary teachers are not real academics, but from the special environment of
the public school within which elementary and secondary teachers, un-
like their colleagues at the post-secondary level, operate. Therefore, their
rights must yield to the special state interests that are absent in post-
secondary institutions.
A final indication that student speech rights are not alone in falling
victim to school interests, demonstrating that school speech controver-
sies turn on the scope of the school interest rather than the scope of the
student interest, can be found in American Future Systems, Inc. v. State
University of New York at Courtland.91 In that case, a corporation en-
gaged in selling certain products to college students through group dem-
onstrations brought suit to challenge a university rule banning that
activity in the university dormitories. The court viewed the sales
presentations as commercial speech,92 and so applied the standard enun-
ciated in Central Hudson.93 However, the court did not simply treat the
case as a typical commercial speech case; rather, it "note[d] that this
particular regulation of commercial speech must be evaluated 'in light of
the special characteristics of the school environment' ";91 and it defined
its "task... [as] measur[ing] the regulation against the Central Hudson
standard, with due consideration for the university's educational objec-
90. See Adams v. Campbell City Sch. Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 1975)
("[Teachers do not] have an unlimited liberty as to structure and content of the courses, at
least at the secondary level."); Millikan v. Board of Directors, 611 P.2d 414,418 (Wash. 1980)
('Since... course content is manifestly a matter within the board's discretion, petitioners'
claims of academic freedom are not well taken." (footnotes omitted)); see also Nicholson v.
Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that a high school journalism teacher's
First Amendment right to print the articles of his choice are effectively equal to that of his
students).
But see Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1979) ("[A]
teacher has a constitutional ight... to engage in a teaching method of his or her own choos-
ing...").
91. 565 F. Supp. 754 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
92. Id. at 761-62.
93. Central Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Speech that is "related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience," id at
561; can be regulated if the regulation serves a "substantial" governmental interest, id at 566;
the regulation "directly advances the governmental interest asserted," id.; and the regulation is
"not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest," id
94. American Future Sy. Inc, 565 F. Supp. at 763 (citation omitted).
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tives."9" Thus, a curtailment of commercial speech interests that admit-
tedly would have been invalid in the context of outside society was
upheld because the speech at issue took place in the "special environ-
ment" of the schools.
Student speech interests often bow to the interests of the school not
because student speech interests are less weighty than those of adults, but
because the school asserts special interests that are not normally asserted
by outside society.96 In order to construct a framework for determining
when the school's interest takes precedence over the free speech interests
of students, the first step must be to determine the nature and weight of
the school's interest.
B. Defining the School Interest
Part I of this Article argued that schools may restrict the speech of
their students to a greater degree than outside society can restrict the
speech of school-aged citizens because schools are a special environment
in which special state interests inhere. The necessary corollary to that
thesis is that schools may enforce those greater restrictions on student
speech only when those restrictions are enacted in pursuit of some inter-
est unique to the public schools and absent in outside society. If such
were not the case, there would be no call to construct a unique analytical
framework for application to school speech controversies. If the interests
of students and school-aged citizens are identical, and if the interest of
the state did not vary according to the locus of the speech, then any
analysis suitable for the adjudication of generic speech controversies
would be equally suitable for the adjudication of student speech disputes.
For example, a school regulation forbidding on-campus possession
by students of Playboy magazine must be judged by the same standard as
a state statute that forbids possession by all school-aged citizens, unless
the school regulation serves some school-specific purpose that is not
served by the hypothetical state statute. Likewise, absent a school-spe-
cific purpose, school library censorship must be judged by the same stan-
dard employed to adjudicate borrowing restrictions imposed on school-
aged patrons by a public library. 97 This general principle has been uti-
lized by the Supreme Court in regard to high school students' Fourth
Amendment rights. In New Jersey v. T.L. 0. 98 the Court held that school
95. Id
96. But see Diamond, supra note 31, at 490 ("A number of Supreme Court cases decided
after Tinker demonstrate.., the impractical nature of the Court's statement that schoolchil-
dren are 'persons' and thus entitled to First Amendment protection.").
97. See infra Part II.C.
98. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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officials need only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to search the
persons and effects of students. This contrasts with the probable cause
standard that applies to some searches and seizures conducted by govern-
ment agents operating in outside society.99 T.L.O. was based in small
part on the rationale that school officials should not be held to the search
and seizure standards that apply to law enforcement officers because
school officials are not trained in search and seizure rules and tech-
niques. 11 But the principal distinction that the Court drew between the
school and outside society was that the risk of harm from unconfiscated
contraband and weapons is greater in the school than in outside soci-
ety.101 The decision most emphatically was not based on a determination
that student Fourth Amendment rights are of less moment than are
Fourth Amendment rights of non-students. 2 The Court recognized
that school searches serve state interests that are not implicated by the
usual search that takes place outside school grounds. Therefore, the bal-
ance between the state interests and the Fourth Amendment interests of
suspects leans more heavily toward the state interests during on-campus
searches, and so the standard of suspicion required to justify an on-cam-
pus search is less stringent. 03
T.L. 0. was an extension of a series of Supreme Court decisions that
have held many general criminal procedure rules, such as the warrant
requirement, inapplicable when exigent circumstances exist. Exigent cir-
cumstances exist when an important governmental interest will be frus-
trated if the usual rules are followed."° The existence of school-specific
interests that stand in opposition to student free speech rights are analo-
gous to the exigent circumstances of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
99. See, ag., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-66 (1968).
100. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
101. "It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which
searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject." Id. at 340. See also id. at 352-53 (Black-
mun, J., concurring) ("Indeed, because drug use and possession of weapons has become in-
creasingly common among young people, an immediate response frequently is required not just
to maintain an environment conducive to learning, but to protect the very safety of students
and school personnel.").
102. "A search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person,
no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of
subjective expectations of privacy." Id. at 337-38 (footnote omitted).
103. Id. at 341 ("the accomodation of the privacy interests of the schoolchildren with the
substantial need.., to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the
requirement that searches be based on probable cause.").
104. See id. at 340. ("Just as we have in other cases dispensed with the warrant require-
ment when 'the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search,' Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. at 532-33, we hold today that school
officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority.").
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Just as a lower standard of Fourth Amendment protection applies only
when "exigent circumstances" exist, so too a lower standard of First
Amendment protection may apply only when the existence of special,
school-specific interests demand greater student speech restrictions than
those imposed on school-aged citizens by outside society.
Analysis of student.speech controversies, therefore, must include an
examination of the school interest that purportedly justifies the chal-
lenged speech restriction. This examination must focus on whether that
interest is unique to the school environment, in which case the reviewing
court must employ a school-specific analysis, or whether the school regu-
lation is designed to serve some general societal interest, in which case no
special, school-specific analysis need be applied, and the reviewing court
may analyze the restriction on the same grounds as if it were asserted
generally by outside society.105
The school-specific interests of the public school are those interests
that arise out of the public school's unique role as the educator of youth.
Despite the existence of competing educational ideologies, there is rela-
tively little disagreement among courts as to the general nature of that
role. Rather, the disagreement arises over the means by which the public
school fulfills its role. All agree that the fundamental purpose of the
public school is to teach facts and skills, and to "inculcat[e] fundamental
values" necessary to the maintenance of a democratic system. 106
But, another ideological current also runs through the cases. The
Supreme Court stated that "[i]n our system, students may not be re-
garded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate. They may not be confined to the expression of those senti-
ments that are officially approved." 17 The Court further stated, "[i]f
105. By "asserted generally" I do not mean to suggest that the school regulation should be
analyzed as if it was a time, place, and manner restriction; i.e., it should not be analyzed as if it
were a state statute that forbids expression of the speech at issue on school grounds. Rather,
because in the absence of some school-specific interest the school stands in relation to the
students precisely as the state stands in relation to its school-aged citizens, the school regula-
tion should be analyzed as if it were a state statute, the terms of which are identical to those of
the school regulation but that applies those restrictions to all school-aged students regardless
of the location of the speech.
106. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979); see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); id. at 876
(Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 896 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
107. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 369 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). Accord Fraser, 478
U.S. at 689-90 (Brennan J., concurring); Pico, 457 U.S. at 864-66, 886 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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there is one fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion ....
The last two decades of student speech jurisprudence have been es-
sentially a struggle between these two conflicting principles. Repeatedly,
this struggle has been resolved only by recourse to educational ideology.
To diminish or eliminate the dominant role of educational ideology,
courts must employ an analysis that removes the tensions between these
two competing tenets. 10 9
In his concurrence in Pico, Justice Blackmun recognized that a con-
flict exists between the two principles, 1 and he suggested a method of
reconciling them. Justice Blackmun proposed that a reviewing court
"strike a proper balance [between the two principles] ... by holding that
school officials may not remove books for thepurpose of restricting access
to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when that
action is motivated simply by the officials' disapproval of the ideas in-
volved."' I I As an example of how his analysis would be applied, Justice
Blackmun hypothesized that "removing a learned treatise criticizing
American foreign policy from an elementary school library because the
108. West Va. Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 642; see also Keyfshian, 385 U.S. at 603 ("[Ihe
First Amendment . . . does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom.").
109. It can be argued that no such conflict exists because Supreme Court concerns extend
only to school efforts to "prescribe ... orthodox[y]", Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642, in matters
involving politics and religion, which matters are distinct from "societal values." But that
distinction exists more in fantasy than in fact. In modem society, virtually every issue includes
some political component. The public school may well perceive its anti-drug message as an
attempt to inculcate values and morality, rather than an attempt to "prescribe. .. [political]
orthodox[y]," id.; nevertheless, the truth remains that "LSD guru" Timothy Leary's "tune in,
turn on, drop out" was very much a political message.
Similarly, "thou shalt not kill" is clearly a moral message, and, despite its Judeo-Christian
origins, few would question that the public school may attempt to inculcate that value. Even
that seemingly simple admonition has a political component, however, for society does not
view "thou shalt not kill" as an absolute. Rather, "the shared values of a civilized [American]
social order," Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683, deem killing permissible when in self-defense, or when
the victim is an enemy who is killed on the battlefield, but deem killing impermissible when it
takes the form of euthanasia. A school that attempts to inculcate "values" may find itself
instead asserting a political middle ground between students who subscribe to an interpretation
of "thou shalt not kill" that is either more expansive ("Killing is never right") or less expansive
("Euthanasia is moral") than the interpretation that is adopted by society. This is nothing less
than the "prescri[ption]... of orthodox[y]" that the First Amendment forbids.
The distinction between political or religious views and values or morality is a chimera,
and so the argument that the public school has the right to successfully inculcate values or
morality has no analytical legs upon which to stand.
110. "To my mind, this case presents a particularly complex problem because it involves
two competing principles of constitutional stature." Pico, 457 U.S. at 876.
111. Id. at 879-80.
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students would not understand it" 2 is an action unrelated to the purpose
of suppressing ideas. In my view, however, removing the same treatise
because it is 'anti-American' raises a far more difficult issue."'"13  Thus,
Justice Blackmun would alleviate the tension between the school's power
to inculcate values and the students' free speech rights by scrutinizing the
reasons behind the school's attempts at censorship. His analysis focuses
on whether school officials have abused their discretion over the process
of inculcation. His approach limits that discretion by providing guide-
lines, based on the school's purpose, for the exercise of that discretion.
Justice Blackmun's proposed framework, while solid in theory,
might prove ineffective in practice. Under his analysis, school officials
seeking to avoid conflict with the First Amendment rights of their stu-
dents would need only to claim that the restrictions were intended to
serve some innocuous purpose.1 14 A court confronted with a speech re-
straint, such as the removal of library books, justified by school officials
on the basis that the expression involved is "psychologically or intellectu-
ally inappropriate for the age group,"115 would have no choice but to rule
in favor of the school. The court would have no practical way to chal-
lenge the officials' assertion that the expression was inappropriate, for the
question of appropriateness for a particular age group is a determination
particularly within the expertise of school officials. The court would
have little recourse but to defer to the school's judgment.
116
The Court is simultaneously devoted to two countervailing princi-
ples: the public school's role is to inculcate community values and stu-
dent free speech rights are most holy. An alternative to resolve this
dilemma is to define the school's inculcative interest in a manner that
eliminates conflict with the First Amendment. "Inculcation" can in fact
112. For a discussion of the often asserted school interest in censoring speech that is inap-
propriate for student audiences, see infra notes 147-50, 162-64 and accompanying text.
113. Pico, 457 U.S. at 881.
114. Justice Blackmun mentions several such innocuous purposes, including avoiding stu-
dent exposure to offensive language, id at 880, removing books that are "psychologically or
intellectually inappropriate" for students, id., and protecting students from ideas that are
"'manifestly inimical to the public welfare'" (citation omitted), id.
115. Iad
116. Arguably, a trial court could make an independent judgment as to the appropriateness
of any particular expression on the basis of expert testimony; however, the resulting battle of
experts might prove to be somewhat less than illuminating. It can also be argued that the
circumstances surrounding the promulgation of speech restrictions can reveal ulterior motives.
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985) (The Court looked to legislative history of
"moment-of-silence" statute; the bill's sponsor had "inserted into the bill, apparently without
dissent, a statement indicating that the legislation was an 'effort to return voluntary prayer' to
the public schools."). It seems doubtful, however, that in most cases the record would provide
so clear a picture of the motives of school officials.
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be used in at least two ways. It can mean "an attempt to instill" or "a
successful attempt to instill." Because the scope of student free speech
rights is derived from the school's interest in suppressing speech, the defi-
nition of inculcation should be paramount in student speech jurispru-
dence. To restate this issue in terms of balancing the free speech interests
of students against the countervailing interests of the school, the question
is the following: Is the school's inculcative interest fulfilled when the
school's message has been communicated by the school and received by
the students, or is that interest fulfilled only when the students have both
received the message and adopted it as well?
Only Justice Brennan seems to have recognized this distinction, but
even he has failed to recognize that the essential issue is the definition of
the school's interest. Although he has never expressly explored the defi-
nition of inculcate, Justice Brennan has implicitly employed a definition
that means "attempt to instill." His selection of synonyms for inculcate
most strongly evidences this interpretation. In Pico, Justice Brennan
concluded his discussion of the inculcative interest of the public school
by adopting language from the respondent school board's brief: "We are
therefore in full agreement with petitioners that local school boards must
be permitted to 'establish and apply their curriculum[s] in such a way as
to transmit community values .... "1 17 In Hazelwood, Justice Brennan
defined the school interest as "convey[ing] . . . information and tools"
and, again, as "transmitting to [students] an official dogma of 'commu-
nity values.' "18 Justice Brennan employs the "attempt to instill" defini-
tion. Because he views the school interest as "transmitting" its message,
it is not clear if he realizes that his definition of inculcate is different from
that of his colleagues. Justice Brennan has, however, recognized that a
distinction exists between student speech that interferes with the school's
ability to communicate its message, and student speech that merely com-
petes with that message and thereby interferes only with the adoption of
the school's message by the students. Because Justice Brennan's analysis
implicitly argues that defining the school's interest as "successful inculca-
tion" is inconsistent with the First Amendment, it is worthy of quotation
at length:
Free student expression undoubtedly sometimes interferes with the
effectiveness of the school's pedagogical functions. Some brands of
student expression do so by directly preventing the school from
pursuing its pedagogical mission: The young polemic who stands
on a soapbox during calculus class to deliver an eloquent political
117. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10) (emphasis added).
118. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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diatribe interferes with the legitimate teaching of calculus....
Other student speech, however, frustrates the school's legitimate
pedagogical purposes merely by expressing a message that conflicts
with the school's, without directly interfering with the school's ex-
pression of its message: A student who responds to a political sci-
ence teacher's question with the retort, "socialism is good,"
subverts the school's inculcation of the message that capitalism is
better. ... Likewise, the student newspaper that.., conveys a
moral position at odds with the school's official stance might sub-
vert the administration's legitimate inculcation of its own percep-
tion of community values.
If mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message
were a constitutionally sufficient justificatioh for the suppression of
student speech, school officials could censor each of the students or
student organizations in the foregoing hypotheticals, converting
our public schools into "enclaves of totalitarianism," (citation
omitted) .... The First Amendment permits no such blanket cen-
sorship authority. 1 9
The unexpressed rationale that underlies Justice Brennan's analysis
is inescapable. His argument that the First Amendment prevents school
censorship of student speech that is "mere[ly] incompatible with the
school's pedagogical message," is valid only if the school's interest is lim-
ited to communicating the message. If instead the school's interest is
defined as "successful inculcation," then any student speech which criti-
cizes or expresses a view contrary to that message reduces the chances
that other students will accept the validity of the school's message and
thereby interferes with the accomplishment of the school's interest. As a
result, the school could indeed "censor each of the students or student
organizations" that Justice Brennan hypothetically presents in his Hazel-
wood dissent, including "the maverick who sits in class passively sporting
a symbol of protest against a government policy" and "the gossip who
... swap[s] stories of sexual escapade [and thereby] muddle[s] a clear
official message ... condemning teenage sex." '2  If the First Amend-
ment does not protect such student speech it is difficult to imagine what
speech it does protect. A definition of the school's purpose as "successful
inculcation" simply cannot coexist with the notion that student First
Amendment rights survive the students' daily passage through "the
schoolhouse gate."
1 21
Justice Brennan has provided the completion of our analytical
framework. That framework defines the school's interest as communica-
tive; that is, the school's attempt to inculcate is complete, and so its inter-
119. Id. at 279-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id at 280.
121. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
Fall 19911
150 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:123
est is fully served when its message has been communicated by the school
and received by the students. Therefore, the school cannot restrict any
student speech right, 122 unless the students' exercise of that right inter-
feres with the transmission or reception of the school's message.
A hypothetical1 23 that illustrates this framework (hereinafter "com-
munication analysis") is the following: Can a school censor a school
newspaper that describes how to "freebase" cocaine? 124 The first step of
the analysis is to identify the interests served by the speech restriction.
Under this hypothetical, the school's censorship serves two interests. 25
It clearly serves to prevent drug use by minors. It arguably also serves a
second interest of inculcating the "community value" that drug use is
wrong. 1
26
The next step is to determine whether the interests are school-spe-
cific or of a type asserted generally 27 by outside society. A school-spe-
cific interest either relates to the school's inculcation of values and
information, or addresses problems that exist only in schools. 128 The in-
terest in preventing drug use is not school-specific because drug use is a
society-wide problem, and as a result a plethora of drug-use regulations
have been adopted and apply throughout society. In contrast, the inter-
est in inculcating the value that drug use is improper is school-specific.
Of course, society as a whole has an interest in inculcating that particular
value in minors as a means of preventing drug use, but schools are the
mechanism by which society attempts to inculcate that message. This
special school role is the very source of the school's ability to restrict
student speech to a greater degree than society can restrict similar speech
outside the special environment of the school. 29 If a school speech re-
striction serves an interest that is asserted generally by outside society,
then it should be analyzed under traditional First Amendment analysis.
122. Included in the term, "student speech right," are all of the rights that arguably are
included within the protections of the First Amendment, including the right to receive infor-
mation. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982).
123. This hypothetical was suggested by a colleague. Thomas Shantz, Remarks at Infor-
mal Gathering (April 15, 1988).
124. For purposes of this hypothetical, a student newspaper will be treated as a generic
student expression, rather than as student expression that is "sponsored" by the school. See
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-73. The Hazelwood Court's distinction between school-sponsored
and other student speech is discussed infra at Part II.D.
125. When a speech restriction serves more than one state interest, the reviewing court
should analyze each interest separately.
126. Courts have identified several, apparently non-communication-oriented, school inter-
ests. Those interests are discussed infra at notes 147-50, 163-71 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
129. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
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That is, the school regulation should be analyzed as if it were a state
statute that imposes identical restrictions on all school-aged citizens.
This analysis is appropriate for school regulations that serve societal in-
terests because only regulations that serve school-specific interests can
legitimately discriminate between students in school and school-aged citi-
zens outside of school.13 ° Returning to the hypothetical, a reviewing
court should first analyze the censorship by assuming that the regulation
is in fact a state statute that forbids the dissemination of drug use infor-
mation to all minors. The reviewing court's determination of the consti-
tutionality of such a hypothetical statute would then control the
determination of the constitutionality of the school regulation. 31 If the
school regulation does not serve a societal interest, or if the societal inter-
est served by the regulation fails to justify the regulation under review,
then the reviewing court should employ communication analysis to ex-
amine the regulation in the context of the school-specific interest that it
serves. The court must determine whether the student speech interferes
with the school's communication of its message. If the school's ability to
communicate is unhampered by the student speech, then the regulation
would be unconstitutional. Under this analysis, the regulation would be
illegitimate. The article on "freebasing," with its implied message that
drug use is acceptable, certainly competes with the school's message that
drug use is immoral, but it leaves the channels of communication be-
tween the school and its students unobstructed. Of course, if the regula-
tion legitimately serves a societal interest, its failure to serve a legitimate
school-specific interest is moot.
Under this same analysis, Tinker was properly decided, for it is only
under unusual circumstances that silent student protest will prevent the
school from communicating with its students. 132 The essence of commu-
nication analysis is that student expression which prevents the school
from communicating its message simply cannot coexist with that school
130. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The corollary to this principle is that a
state statute that regulates only the speech of students and that serves school-specific interests
should be treated as if it were a school regulation and analyzed under communication analysis.
131. For example, if the Court had employed this analysis, it would have analyzed Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986) (lewd student speech at school assem-
bly), as being controlled in large part by FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(FCC can limit broadcast of lewd program to hours when children are unlikely to be listening).
See infra notes 173-81 and accompanying text.
132. Such circumstances may arise when a silent protest sparks widespread physical distur-
bances, or when, despite the teacher's efforts to teach, class discussion is diverted from the
subject at hand to the subject of the protest.
It should be noted that Justice Black found just such a diversion of attention to have
occurred in Tinker: "There is also evidence that a teacher of mathematics had his lesson
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message. In most instances, silent or symbolic student speech can indeed
coexist with that of the school; while a student oration at the back of the
classroom drowns out the teacher's attempts to communicate with the
students, a passive student protest has no such effect.
Because this analysis defines the school's inculcative interest as "at-
tempting to inculcate" and therefore allows the school to censor only
student speech that prevents the school from expressing its message, it
eliminates the role of educational ideology as the determining factor in
adjudication of student speech controversies. Regardless of whether the
school chooses to inculcate values by telling students that certain values
are good, or instead by prodding students into discovering the virtues of
those values by themselves, the school's interest in communicating its
message is identical.
A school that employs an inculcative ideology cannot teach if its
statement "premarital sex is bad," is interrupted or drowned out by Jus-
tice Brennan's "young polemic who stands on a soapbox"' 33 during class.
That same young polemic equally frustrates teaching by a school that
employs a non-inculcative ideology if his or her expression drowns out
the school's communication of those questions that the school hopes will
elicit from students the realization that "premarital sex is bad." Both
schools seek to instill the same value, and both schools, regardless of
educational ideology, must be able to communicate with their students.
Therefore, if the school's interest is defined as being able to communi-
cate, the young polemic is equally subject to censorship in either school.
In contrast, the student who politely raises a hand, waits to be rec-
ognized by the teacher, and thereupon expresses the opinion that "pre-
marital sex is good," disrupts communication by neither school. Both
schools will be upset with the student, not only because he or she has
failed to accept the lesson that each school attempted to instill, but also
because the student's expression of a value contrary to that the school
sought to inculcate might influence other students to reject the school's
value. The inculcative school's interest in suppressing the student's
speech should not be considered greater than that of the non-inculcative
school. The inculcative school may no more suppress student speech
that does not compete with its message than can the non-inculcative
period practically 'wrecked' chiefly by disputes with Mary Beth Tinker, who wore her arm-
band for her 'demonstration.'" 393 U.S. at 517-18 (Black, J., dissenting).
However, it seems from this brief description that the "disputes with Mary Beth Tinker"
were carried out not by other students but by the mathematics teacher. Certainly, a school
speech restriction cannot be upheld on the ground that teaching was disrupted not by the
speech itself, but by school efforts to silence the speech.
133. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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school. Under communication analysis, educational ideology is irrele-
vant because the school's interest in suppressing speech is identical re-
gardless of the educational ideology that the school employs.
C. Communication Analysis and the School Library Conundrum"'
Perhaps the most intractable problem in student speech jurispru-
dence is whether there should be a distinction, for First Amendment pur-
poses, between school library book removal and school library book
acquisition.
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Pico took pains to distinguish
that case from a case in which school acquisition of books was
challenged:
[Tihe action before us does not involve the acquisition of books.
Respondents have not sought to compel their school Board [sic] to
add to the school library shelves any books that the students desire
to read. Rather, the only action challenged in this case is the re-
moval from the school libraries of books originally placed there by
school authorities, or without objection from them.135
The distinction between book removal and book acquisition immedi-
ately provoked criticism and controversy. Justice Blackmun, in his con-
currence, expressed "doubt that there is a theoretical distinction between
removal of a book and failure to acquire a book," '13 6 but argued that a
distinction between book removal and book acquisition is justified
because
[T]here is a profound practical and evidentiary distinction between
the two actions: "Removal, more than failure to acquire, is likely
to suggest that an impermissible political motivation may be pres-
ent. There are many reasons why a book is not acquired, the most
obvious being limited resources, but there are few legitimate rea-
sons why a book, once acquired, should be removed from a library
not filled to capacity." '37
134. Library book removal is often justified on the basis that particular books are
inappropriate for students or that the books are vulgar. The public school's interest in
excluding speech that is inappropriate for children is discussed infra at notes 147-50, 162-64
and accompanying text. The public school's interest in censoring vulgar speech is discussed
infra at Part II.E.
135. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 862 (1982).
As noted earlier, nothing in our decision today affects in any way the discretion of a
local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of their schools. Because
we are concerned in this case with the suppression of ideas, our holding today affects
only the discretion to remove books.
Id. at 871-72.
136. Id. at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
137. d at 878-79 n.1 (quoting Judge Newman's concurring opinion in the Court of Ap-
peals decision in Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 436 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J.,
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The dissenters objected to the plurality's distinction, and in particular
took issue with its argument that avoidance of the suppression of ideas
justifies the distinction:
According to the plurality, the evil to be avoided is the "official
suppression of ideas." It does not follow that the decision to re-
move a book is less [sic] "official suppression" than the decision not
to acquire a book desired by someone. Similarly, a decision to
eliminate certain material from the curriculum, history for exam-
ple, would carry an equal-probably greater-prospect of "official
suppression." 
138
The Sixth Circuit in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School District,139
decided before Pico, took another approach to the distinction between
removal and acquisition of books. Minarcini concerned a school board
decision to reject certain books for use as textbooks and to remove copies
of the books from the school library. The court upheld the board's deci-
sion to reject the books for use as textbooks, but it held that the First
Amendment forbids removal of copies of the books from the school li-
brary. In regard to textbook selection, the court reasoned that "discre-
tion as to the selection of textbooks must be lodged somewhere and we
can find no federal constitutional prohibition which prevents its being
lodged in school board officials.... ."1 In contrast, the court employed
a public forum-like analysis to the book removals:
Neither the State of Ohio nor the [school district] was under any
federal constitutional compulsion to provide a library . . . or to
choose any particular books. Once having created such a privilege
for the benefit of its students, however, neither body could place
conditions on the use of the library which were related solely to the
concurring)). See also Joy Koletsky, Case Note, First Amendment-Free Speech. Right to
Know-Limit of School Board's Discretion in Curricular Choice-Public School Library as Mar-
ketplace of Ideas, 27 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 1034, 1049 (1977) ("The only apparent distinction
between a case involving selection of books and one involving removal is an evidentiary prob-
lem in the former.").
138. Pico, 457 U.S. at 892-93. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
See also id. at 895 (Powell, J., dissenting).
If a 14-year-old child may challenge a school board's decision to remove a book from
the library, upon what theory is a court to prevent a like challenge to a school
board's decision not to purchase that identical book? And at the even more "sensi-
tive" level of "receiving ideas," does today's decision entitle student oversight of
which courses may be added or removed from the curriculum, or even of what a
particular teacher elects to teach or not to teach in the classroom? Is not the "right
to receive ideas" as much- or indeed even more- implicated in these educational
questions?
Id at 916 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The failure of a library to acquire a book denies access
to its contents just as effectively as does the removal of the book from the library's shelf.").
139. 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd, 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976).
140. 541 F.2d at 579.
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social or political tastes of school board members. '4
This analysis is no more convincing than Justice Brennan's in Pico.
First, the court's public forum test used to analyze library book removal
collapses if the school library is viewed as a non-public forum. The view
that a school library is not a public forum is consistent with Justice
Rehnquist's view of the school library as simply another tool that serves
the school's inculcative efforts. But, like Justice Brennan's Pico analysis,
the Minarcini analysis was partly predicated on the school library's "spe-
cial[] dedicat[ion] to broad dissemination of ideas." 42 This view con-
flicts with that of Justice Rehnquist, and so the Minarcini holding is
premised on acceptance of the court's particular opinion of the nature of
the school library.
The problems with distinguishing book selection from book removal
vanish if First Amendment protection is extended only to student speech
that does not interfere with communication by the school. As a matter
of educational policy, a school can make a judgment that students must
be exposed to certain books as a part of the school curriculum, or that
students must at least have access to those books through the school li-
brary. 3 A student demand that certain books be selected interferes
with the school's pursuit of that policy; because school resources are fi-
nite, the school's purchase of one book demanded by students forces the
school to forego the purchase of a book of the school's choosing. Any
such restriction on the school's ability to purchase the books it chooses
necessarily interferes with the school's attempt to communicate the
messages expressed by those books."4
In contrast, restrictions on the school's ability to remove books from
the school library do not interfere with the school's ability to communi-
cate. The presence in the library of books that the school deems undesir-
able does not interfere with student access to other books that the school
endorses. Unlike the case of the young classroom polemic whose speech
drowns out the speech of the teacher, the two sets of books can coexist,
neither preempting the other. At most, the presence of undesirable
141. M. at 582.
142. Id at 583.
143. See generally E.D. HIRscH, JR., CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN
NEEDS TO KNOW (1987) (arguing that the primary role of education is the acculturation of
youth, which is accomplished in part by exposing them to certain culturally significant texts).
144. This same argument holds in regard to the school's decision as to "which courses may
be added or removed from the curriculum, or even [as to] what a particular teacher elects to
teach. . . ." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 895 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). Student
insistence that the school offer a course in particle physics interferes with the school's ability to
commit classroom and human resources to physical education, and it prevents the communi-
cation of the lessons inherent in the teaching of that other class.
Fall 19911
156 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 19:123
books only competes with the school-endorsed books for the attention of
students, but such competition is at the center of First Amendment val-
ues. Surely, the school may not remove a work by Marx because stu-
dents find that book more persuasive and compelling than a school-
endorsed tome written by Adam Smith. Further, while the school can
assert a legitimate pedagogical interest in ensuring that students have ac-
cess to certain "great books," school attempts to prevent exposure to
other books serves no such valid pedagogical purpose14 and clearly is an
attempt to "prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion.
' '146
D. "School-Sponsored" Speech
Application of communication analysis to school censorship of stu-
dent newspapers and school plays is more problematic. In Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier,14 7 the Court established a dichotomy be-
tween school censorship of "a student's personal expression that happens
to occur on the school premises"148 and censorship of student expression
that arises out of "school-sponsored .. .expressive activities."' 49 The
Court held that because the school has interests in regulating school-
sponsored speech that it does not have in regulating speech that "hap-
pens to occur" on campus, a different standard should apply to censor-
ship of these two types of speech. "A school," the Court reasoned,
"must... retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that
might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irrespon-
sible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the shared values of a
civilized social order.' "150
145. But see Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Pico, in which he argues that "[olf necessity,
elementary and secondary educators must separate the relevant from the irrelevant, the appro-
priate from the inappropriate. Determining what information not to present to the students is
often as important as identifying relevant material." 457 U.S. at 914 (Rehnquist, I., dissent-
ing). Justice Rehnquist's argument is not persuasive. It is certainly reasonable for a high
school biology teacher, in the interests of saving time and facilitating student understanding of
basic concepts, to limit the class readings on evolution to the works of Darwin and to omit the
works of Huxley and Lamarck. It is another matter for the school to decree that a proper
education in biology necessarily precludes exposure to the works of those two scientists, and so
student access to the scientists' books must be prevented. Justice Rehnquist's argument is a
cogent one for granting schools wide latitude in selecting library books and planning curricu-
lum, but it utterly falls as a rationalization for library book removal.
146. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
147. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
148. Id. at 271.
149. Id.
150. I L at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
This pronouncement misstates the issue presented in Hazelwood.
The issue was not whether a school can be forced "affirmatively to pro-
mote" 1 51 student speech with which the school disagrees, but whether
the school, having created a "school-sponsored . . . expressive ac-
tivit[y],' 5 2 can legitimately censor speech that occurs during that activ-
ity because the school disagrees with the message expressed by that
speech. 5 Although the state may not be forced to open a facility to
public discourse, once it opens such a facility, the First Amendment for-
bids it from censoring speech that occurs there on the grounds of state
disagreement with the views expressed." 4 Hazelwood's holding that the
school newspaper at issue was not a public forum15 1 is essentially irrele-
vant to this issue. The Court's finding that the school newspaper was not
a public forum was based on the specific facts of that case and amounted
only to a holding that that particular student newspaper was not a public
forum. 
156
The Court did conclude that student speech which appears in a
school newspaper is entitled to less First Amendment protection than
other speech, but that conclusion was based on a distinction between the
school's ability to censor student speech that "happens to occur" on cam-
pus and student speech by participants in "school-sponsored... expres-
sive activities." '57 In turn, that distinction was based not on the grounds
that the campus is a public forum and "school-sponsored... expressive
activities" are not, but rather on the basis that:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this second
form of student expression to assure that participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for
their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to the school.' 58
The school's interest in "assur[ing] that participants learn whatever
lessons the activity is designed to teach" is indeed weighty. But it is
151. Id at 270-71.
152. Id at 271.
153. Id at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The State's prerogative to dissolve the student newspaper entirely (or to limit its
subject matter) no more entitles it to dictate which viewpoints students may express
on its pages, than the State's prerogative to close down the schoolhouse entitles it to
prohibit the non-disruptive expression of antiwar sentiment within its gates.
154. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985);
Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
155. 484 U.S. at 267-70.
156. See supra notes 40-46, 55 and accompanying text.
157. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
158. Id.
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hardly grounds for distinguishing the school's ability to censor "school-
sponsored" student speech from its ability to censor other student
speech, because that interest is essentially identical to the school's general
interest in teaching students, and that interest is served by all school cen-
sorship efforts.
"[S]chool-sponsored . . . expressive activities" do teach a lesson,
however, which is different from that taught by most other arms of the
school; that is, those activities teach expressive skills to students. Jour-
nalism classes seek to teach students how to research and write newspa-
per articles, and that articles which are "ungrammatical, poorly written,
inadequately researched, [or] biased or prejudiced" '159 cannot be pub-
lished in a quality newspaper. The school communicates that lesson by
allowing publication of only those student articles that are properly
researched and written. Therefore, publication of a student article that is
"ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, [or] biased or
prejudiced" prevents the school from communicating its lesson."o
Although the unique lesson that is taught by "school-sponsored...
expressive activities" allows the school to censor poorly written articles,
it does not imply that the school may censor the content of school-spon-
sored student speech. Students can learn proper grammar, proper re-
search techniques, and the dangers of biased reporting regardless of the
values expressed in the articles they write. The First Amendment allows
an English teacher to give a poor grade to a student who uses the word
"ain't" in an essay, but it does not allow the teacher to give a higher
grade to a student whose essay argues that "Drugs ain't good" than she
gives to a student whose otherwise identical essay asserts that "Drugs
ain't bad." Despite the Court's assertion otherwise, the school's interest
in "assur[ing] that participants learn whatever lessons [the journalism
class] is designed to teach" does not permit the school to censor school
newspaper articles solely because those articles "advocate ... conduct
... inconsistent with 'the shared values of a 'civilized social order.' "161
159. Id. The Court also reasons that the school can also censor speech that is "biased...
or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences." Id. The school's interest in censoring such
speech is unrelated to "assur[ing] that participants [in school-sponsored expressive activities]
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach." The school's interest in censoring
student speech which is "vulgar or profane" is discussed infra at Part II.E.
160. Justice Brennan reached this same conclusion in his Hazelwood dissent: "The enu-
merated criteria [i.e., 'ungrammatical,' 'poorly written,' et al.] reflect the skills that the curricu-
lar newspaper 'is designed to teach.' The educator may, under Tinker, constitutionally
'censor' poor grammar, writing, or research because to reward such expression would 'materi-
ally disrup[t]' the newspaper's curricular purpose." 484 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original).
161. Id. at 271-72 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
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The school's pursuit of the first special school interest that Hazelwood
identifies with school-sponsored student speech, therefore, does not merit
excepting censorship of that speech from communication analysis.
The second interest that the Court identifies as the basis for such an
exception is the school's interest in "assur[ing] ... that readers or listen-
ers are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level
of maturity.""6 2 Hazelwood was not the first decision to endorse the idea
that schools may censor "inappropriate" speech.16 Neither Hazelwood
nor any other opinion, however, has done more than simply assert with-
out analysis, that censorship aimed at serving that interest does not run
afoul of the First Amendment. In particular, Hazelwood fails to explain
why the risk of harm from student exposure to school-sponsored inap-
propriate speech is any greater than the risk of harm from exposure to
inappropriate speech outside school-sponsored activities. The Court was
concerned that inappropriate material in a school newspaper might be
"taken home to be read by students' even younger brothers and sis-
ters,""' but that same danger exists in regard to student-distributed "un-
derground" newspapers and political leaflets. In short, the school's
interest in preventing student exposure to inappropriate material is not
unique to school-sponsored speech, so that interest does not justify sub-
jecting censorship of school-sponsored student speech to a different stan-
dard from that applied to censorship of other student speech.
The final interest that Hazelwood identifies as a ground for distin-
guishing school-sponsored student speech from student speech that
"happens to occur" on school grounds is "assur[ing] ... that the views of
the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school."
1 65
The Court indicates that the school's censorship powers are broad in re-
gard to all "expressive activities that students., parents, and members of
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school."1 66 The Court does not explain why the school's pursuit of this
interest justifies a special rule for censorship of school-sponsored speech.
In particular, there seems be no reason for holding that the school's in-
terest in avoiding confusion by students and the general public merits
censorship. Although allowing such confusion to occur might be politi-
cally inexpedient, 167 that interest has no relation to the function of
162. Id at 271.
163. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871, 880 (1982).
164. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 275.
165. Id. at 271.
166. Id
167. See Letwin, supra note 31, at 204-05 ("The 'pragmatic' administrator may feel the
failure to [censor student speech] will be taken as tacit approval of objectionable speech, with
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schools. Quite simply, assuring that the (presumably unconventional)
views and values of student participants in school-sponsored expressive
activities are not erroneously attributed to the school by non-students, is
not "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."16 Under
the very standard enunciated in Hazelwood, therefore, school censorship
aimed at ensuring that non-students do not confuse the views of students
with those of the school, is illegitimate.
The school's interest in avoiding such confusion by students, on the
other hand, does indeed relate to a legitimate pedagogical concern. But,
even this interest does not justify the application of a different standard
to censorship of school-sponsored speech, because that interest can be
adequately protected by communication analysis. If student speech is
delivered in such a manner that other students actually confuse the stu-
dent expression with that of the school, then the student expression
clearly interferes with the school's communication of its message; the
student speaker, perhaps unwittingly, has in effect replaced the schoors
message with the speaker's own. Therefore, if the trial court in a particu-
lar case makes a factual finding that students actually "erroneously at-
tributed" the student speech at issue to the school, 169 then the court
might be justified in upholding the school's power to censor that speech.
In order for the school to prevail in its attempt to censor school-
sponsored student speech, it must show more than the actual existence of
student confusiorn of the censored message with that of the school, for
"'even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,
that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.' "2170 In
many instances, the school can serve its interest in avoiding confusion of
a student message with that of the school by means that are less restric-
tive of student rights than blanket censorship. For example, the school
unpleasant political consequences. Here again, to accept this reasoning would virtually deny
students the protection of the First Amendment.").
168. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
169. The school most likely would be hard pressed to show that such confusion actually
occurred, at least in regard to student expression of values. It is one thing for the school to
argue that the publication of ungrammatical articles in a student newspaper might lead stu-
dents to believe that, despite the protestations of their English teachers, the school does not
consider the use of proper grammar to be important. It is quite another thing to convince a
reasonable fact finder that an article in a student newspaper convinced students that, in actual-
ity, the school believes that drug use and premarital sex should be encouraged. In the final
analysis, the school's assertion that it seeks to censor student speech because of the risk that
students will confuse the students' message with that of the school seems to be a contrived,
poorly masked attempt to censor ideas that the school considers objectionable.
170. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 289 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967), quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
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could include a disclaimer and/or publish its opposing view on the sub-
ject addressed by the student speech. 171
In some cases, the use of less restrictive means might not be practi-
cal. School officials do not have prepublication access to "underground"
newspapers, and disclaimers and opposing viewpoints cannot be "at-
tached" to verbal speech as they can be to publications. There are no
obstacles, however, to the use of less restrictive means when the objec-
tionable student speech occurs in a school newspaper. Even if naive
readers of the Hazelwood school newspaper had erroneously interpreted
the articles on teenage pregnancy as school endorsement of premarital
sex, the school could have dispelled those misconceptions quite easily,
either by requiring that the newspaper publish a disclaimer or by insist-
ing on the inclusion in that issue of an administration editorial setting
forth the school's view of premarital sex by teenagers.
Thus, the last of the interests Hazelwood identifies as grounds for
distinguishing the school's power to censor school-sponsored student
speech from its power to censor student speech that "happens to occur
on the school premises," 172 proves inadequate to justify that distinction.
Absent some other interest uniquely served by school censorship of
school-sponsored student speech, the conflicting interests of school and
student which are implicated by school censorship of school-sponsored
student speech seem best accommodated by communication analysis.
E. Vulgar or Profane Student Speech
The Court has stated repeatedly that schools may censor student
speech that is "vulgar or profane."' 173 The Court discussed this principle
most extensively in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.174 The Fra-
ser Court made passing reference to the principle that vulgar or profane
speech is less protected by the First Amendment than is other speech,
175
but the Court did not rest its holding on this distinction. Instead, the
Court framed the issue as a determination of the balance between "[t]he
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms" and "society's countervailing interest in teach-
171. See id at 289 (Brennan J., dissenting).
172. Id at 271.
173. Idi See also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (schools can remove
library books that are "pervasively vulgar."); id at 880 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 919
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
175. Id. at 680 ("The marked distinction between the political message of the armbands in
Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this case seems to have been given
little weight by the Court of Appeals.").
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hig students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior,"17 6 and
held that
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school educa-
tion to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public dis-
course. Indeed, the "fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system" disfavor the use of
terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others
.... The inculcation of these values is truly the "work of the
schools." 
17 7
School censorship of student speech that is vulgar or profane serves
two interests. First is the school's interest in "inculcat[ing] the habits
and manners of civility. T178 The second interest is in preventing young
students from being offended 79 by exposure to such speech. The preven-
tion of student exposure to "offensive" speech is not a school-specific
interest, for that interest is exercised throughout society by statutes that
forbid dissemination of pornography to minors and by federal regula-
tions such as those at issue in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.' Such cen-
sorship, therefore, should be judged according to the Pacifica standard,
not according to communication analysis.' 8'
Communication analysis8 2 can be applied, however, to a school's
attempts to serve its pedagogical function of "inculcat[ing] the habits and
manners of civility" ' 3 by censoring student speech that is vulgar or pro-
fane. When that speech occurs during a student address before a school
assembly as in Fraser, or in an article in a student newspaper as in Hazel-
wood, censorship 84 is appropriate. Just as the school's refusal to publish
student articles that are poorly written is the very essence of the school's
176. Id. at 681.
177. Id. at 683 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)).
178. Id. at 681.
179. Id.
180. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, the Court held that the FCC could regulate the
broadcast time of a program that included speech that was "'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and 'shock-
ing,"' ia at 747, in order to avoid exposing children to that speech. School censorship of
vulgar or profane student speech, censorship aimed at preventing student exposure to that
speech, must be adjudicated not according to communication analysis, which applies only to
censorship in pursuit of school-specific interests, but instead according to the principles laid
down in Pacifica.
181. Application of Pacifica's analysis to school censorship of student speech is problem-
atic, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
182. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text, for discussion of communication
analysis.
183. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
184. "Censorship" can of course take different forms. The school can serve its interest by
simply excising the offending words from a student newspaper article, but such limited censor-
ship cannot be applied in cases such as Fraser, where the school could censor only after the
fact.
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communication of its message that poorly written articles are inappropri-
ate for publication in a quality newspaper, the school's only practical
means of communicating the lesson that profane speech is inappropriate
in public discourse is to censor that speech when it occurs in student
public discourse.
18 1
Of course, recognition that in certain circumstances students' vulgar
speech interferes with the school's communication of its lesson that such
speech is inappropriate in public discourse, leaves unresolved many
problems associated with school censorship of vulgar speech. Among
those problems is the issue of what level of vulgarity justifies school
censorship. 
186
Also, it is difficult to determine to what extent school removal of
library books which contain vulgar speech serves the school's interest in
teaching that such speech is inappropriate in public discourse. Does
presence of such speech in school library books indicate to the student
that such speech is appropriate? If so, that message merely competes
with the school's message without stifling it. Unlike the case of school
censorship of vulgar student speech, school censorship of books that con-
tain vulgar speech is not essential to the school's communication of the
message that such speech by students is inappropriate."8 7 In the final
analysis, schools should not be able to remove library books simply be-
cause their presence interferes with the school's ability to communicate
its lesson that vulgar speech is inappropriate. The school certainly can-
not remove Huckleberry Finn in pursuit of its goal of teaching proper
grammar,"'8 and so the school cannot remove the same book for the
analogous purpose of teaching that vulgar speech is improper. In addi-
185. Such a rule might appear to be contrary to Justice Brennan's assertion that the school
cannot censor speech by "the gossip who sits in the student commons." Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhhmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 280 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting). School censorship of casual
speech, unlike censorship of student speech that applies during student assemblies and in stu-
dent newspapers, is unrelated to the school's goal of "inculcat[ing the] fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system."' Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681
(quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). "Respondent's speech may well
have been protected had he given it in school but under different circumstances, where the
school's legitimate interests in teaching and maintaining civil public discourse were less
weighty." Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
186. Pico speaks of "pervasively vulgar" speech. Board of Edue. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871
(1982). Fraser did not need to address this issue, because the speech there was peppered
throughout with sexual innuendo. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).
187. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
188. The books at issue in Pico contained vulgarities, but the Court did not consider them
"pervasively vulgar." In contrast, HUCKLEBERRY FiNN is certainly pervasively ungrammati-
cal; its very first sentence reads, "You don't know about me without you have read a book by
the name of THE ADVENTURES OF TOM SAWYER; but that ain't no matter." MARK TWAIN,
THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FiNN 11 (Signet Classics 1959).
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tion, allowing schools to remove books on the ground that the books
contain vulgarities provides a golden opportunity for abuse by schools
that might mask their disagreement with the content of certain library
books by asserting that the books are inappropriate because they are vul-
gar."89 Such a risk is undoubtedly real and merits caution in granting
schools the power to censor speech because it is vulgar.
F. Discipline
A final interest often used to justify school censorship of student
speech is the school's interest in promoting student discipline.190 This
interest is certainly legitimate, but it is essential to recognize that the
school in fact has two interests that relate to discipline. The school has
an interest in instilling in students discipline and respect for authority,
and it also has an interest in maintaining discipline in the classroom.
The school's interest in maintaining discipline in the classroom poses no
challenge to the viability of communication analysis.1 91 As a means of
maintaining order, discipline is in fact equivalent to a lack of interference
with school communication. If student speech threatens to disrupt order
in the classroom to the extent that the teacher is no longer able to com-
municate the lessons, the First Amendment does not bar the school from
censoring the disruptive speech. Such was the import of Tinker. A dif-
ferent issue is presented when the school attempts to censor student
speech as a means of inculcating the character trait of discipline into
students. There is no doubt that the school can enact rules aimed at
inculcating discipline, and there is little doubt that many school rules
have this effect, intended or not. 192 Most school disciplinary rules do not
impinge upon student First Amendment interests. Students do indeed
learn a valuable lesson when they are "required to walk ... despite their
desire to run." '19 3 But as a rule, running is not expression, so the school's
ability to censor speech in an attempt to inculcate discipline cannot be
measured by the school's broad powers to enact disciplinary rules that do
189. See Justice Brennan's dissent in Hazelwood: "'[P]otential topic sensitivity' is a vapor-
ous nonstandard... that invites manipulation to achieve ends that cannot permissibly be
achieved through blatant viewpoint discrimination . . . ." 484 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
190. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969) (Black, J., dis-
senting) ("School discipline, like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of train-
ing our children to be good citizens-to be better citizens.").
191. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text, for discussion of communication
analysis.
192. "Children are educated ... when they are required to walk in an orderly fashion from
class to class, despite their desire to run." Diamond, supra note 31, at 478 n.4.
193. Id.
not affect student speech interests. The issue is not whether "students
[may]... refuse[ ] to obey a school order," 194 but whether the school can
require obedience to an order that is designed to inculcate discipline
when such obedience requires that the students surrender their free
speech rights.
It seems manifest that the school cannot require obedience to such
an order. It is difficult to imagine how student speech can prevent the
school from communicating its attempt to inculcate discipline. Disci-
pline is not like grammar; suppressing speech is not the essence of the
school's lesson in regard to discipline. Although a school rule that sup-
presses speech, like any other rule, can certainly teach students discipline
and obedience to authority, the school can teach tlat same lesson by the
enforcement of a plethora of other rules that do not infringe students'
rights.
Also, a standard that recognizes a school's right to teach discipline
by enforcing rules that suppress speech would enable the school to en-
force any rule, no matter how arbitrary. Indeed, the more arbitrary a
rule is, the more effective it is as a tool for teaching discipline, because an
arbitrary rule contains no other lesson.
In his Tinker dissent, Justice Black stated that he feared the Court's
holding was tantamount to holding that "the federal Constitution com-
pels the teachers, parents and elected school officials to surrender control
of the American public school system to public school students." '195
Such a statement reflects a confusion of the two discipline-related school
interests. Allowing students to speak freely where such speech does not
interfere with the communication of any lesson is certainly a restraint on
the school's absolute ability to inculcate discipline. But, it does not inter-
fere with the school's interest in maintaining order in the classroom.
Awareness of this distinction is essential for reaching an equitable ac-
commodation of the competing interests of school and students.
Conclusion
The history of student speech jurisprudence has been a stormy one.
Tinker was a broadly worded endorsement of student liberty, but it was
marred by an unusually bitter dissent by Justice Black.1 96 Subsequently,
the Court could muster only a plurality opinion to support student free
194. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524-25 (Blaci, J., dissenting).
195. d at 526. The Court has recently resurrected this language in both Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) and Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeer, 484 U.S.
260, 272 n.4 (1988)
196. 393 U.S. at 515-26.
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speech in Pico, with Justice Blackmun concurring in the result but point-
edly differing from much of the plurality's rationale, 9 7 while the dissent-
ers authored four different opinions.
In Fraser and Hazelwood, the pendulum swung toward allowing
schools to restrict student speech rights. But the ideological split within
the Court remained pronounced, particularly in Hazelwood. The source
of this recurring disagreement can be traced to the Justices' differing edu-
cational ideologies, but educational ideology need not be the determining
factor in student speech jurisprudence. The crucial role played by educa-
tional ideology resulted from the Court's failure to formulate a single
definition of the school interest which is served by suppression of student
speech, a definition necessary for First Amendment analysis.
This Article has argued that the First Amendment permits only a
definition of the school interest as avoiding interference with its attempt
to inculcate values. Pursuant to that definition, this Article suggests an
analytical framework whereby a reviewing court can determine whether
the school interest justifies suppression of student speech in a particular
case. School censorship is justified only when student speech, if left un-
checked, would prevent the school from communicating with its stu-
dents, or when the student speech is of a type that could legitimately be
censored by the state were the speech uttered (or, in the case of the right
to receive information, received) outside of school by school-aged
citizens.
197. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875-82 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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